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The abrupt end of the Suharto regime in Indonesia is but the most dramatic 
manifestation of a more generalised process of change that has recently swept 
through the countries of Southeast and Northeast Asia (hereafter East Asia). In a 
remarkably short period the former 'miracle' economies have become synonymous 
with economic mismanagement, corruption and cronyism. However this 
transformation is interpreted, the crisis stands as a watershed in East Asian regional 
development, transregional relations and the development of global capitalism more 
generally, especially the dialectical interplay of state and market power. Although it 
may be too soon to attempt definitive judgements about the long-term significance of 
the crisis for the region or for the global political economy more generally, it is 
possible to isolate some of its central dynamics and draw out some of its broader 
implications.  
 At one level, the resolution of the crisis will help to define the framework of 
rules and practices within which future international and national economic activity 
occurs. Transnational institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
powerful international actors like the USA will clearly continue to be significant 
influences in this regard. This will not only constrain the economic policy choices of 
the governments of smaller economies in particular, but will inevitably help to define 
domestic political alignments and practices as well. Simply put, the crisis represents 
what may be a unique historical opportunity to impose a particular sort of market-
centred regulatory framework on the region. At another level, and reinforcing this 
more overt international political pressure, the crisis reveals a deep-seated 
transformation in the structure of the international economic order, one in which the 
power of financial markets and institutions has grown enormously. The scale, scope 
and complexity of financial flows and instruments, and their attenuation from 'real' 
economic activity within individual nations, has meant that nation-states-especially 
less economically powerful ones like Indonesia-are increasingly reduced to the status 
of commodities. In short, I shall argue that a key dynamic in the current crisis is 
internal to markets themselves and has little to do with political and economic 
realities within individual nations.  
 The intention of this article is to consider the implications of the crisis at both 
a general regional level, and in more detail in the case of Indonesia. The first part 
examines important changes in the structure of the increasingly integrated 
international economic system, especially the increasing mobility and power of 
financial capital. Subsequently, I examine the distinctive political and economic 
structures that have been associated with the East Asian region and consider the 
implications of the crisis upon them. One of the key issues here is the wider 
interregional context and the market-orientated reform agenda being promulgated by 
the IMF. Finally, I consider the impact of the crisis on Indonesia, the country that has 
been most profoundly affected by recent events. I suggest that, while there may be 
much that outsiders found unattractive about the authoritarian Suharto regime, 
Indonesia's internal political and economic structures were not the cause of its 
current economic problems. While the cronyism and corruption associated with 
Suharto's rule certainly became a focus of much market attention and retrospective 
analysis, an examination of the Indonesian case suggests that we must look beyond 
the nation-state to the wider political-economic system within which it is embedded, if 
we wish to understand the causes and dynamics of the contemporary crisis.  
 
The changing international order  
 
One of the more enduring images to emerge from the East Asian crisis was of IMF 
Managing Director, Michel Camdessus, standing, arms folded, as Indonesia's 
President Suharto signed an IMF-sponsored assistance package. Quite how 
remarkable a transformation this represented in Indonesia's fortunes in particular, 
and that of the region more generally, may be gauged by recalling Camdessus' own 
words of less than a year earlier, when he suggested the East Asian economies were 
‘the very essence of globalisation-open, dynamic economies that continue to amaze 
the world with their rapid growth and economic development'.1 How times change. To 
understand why the countries of East Asia have experienced such a rapid reversal in 
their collective fortunes, both as the embodiment of an alternative economic 
development paradigm, and as possible sites for international investment, it is 
necessary to examine the wider international system of which they are a part. In 
particular, it is important to recognise the hugely increased scale and power of 
financial capital in the contemporary global political economy.  
 To help explain the increased significance of financial capital, it is useful to 
make a distinction with industrial capital. This is admittedly something of an artificial 
distinction as the boundaries between these spheres are imprecise, particularly 
outside the Anglo-American economies,2 but it at least draws attention to potentially 
different organisational logics and political bases of support for these broadly 
conceived entities. Baldly put, industrial finance is associated with direct investment 
in the actual production of goods and services, while financial capital originates from 
credit-financing, is generally highly liquid and is only indirectly connected with 
productive economic activity.3 Even where financial capital is associated with 
production, it is generally mediated through other instrumentalities, like equities and 
loans, and retains great potential mobility. This long-term evolution and differentiation 
in the structural composition of broadly conceived 'capital' has been a central 
component of the East Asian crisis.  
 
International finance  
 
A number of political, technological and evolutionary developments within the 
financial sector have directly contributed to its enhanced international mobility, 
ubiquity and power.4 Over the course of the twentieth century, as the wealth 
generating capacity of the 'real' productive economy has expanded, there has been a 
simultaneous expansion in the scale and complexity of the financial sector. The most 
significant aspect of this process in the context of the East Asian crisis has been a 
trend towards increasing levels of abstraction and disconnection from the real 
economy by money that is not directly invested in productive activities. Peter Drucker 
describes this as ‘virtual money'.5 Centred on international financial markets, virtual 
money has little connection with trade, investment or consumption, and serves no 
economic function. Virtual money does, however, have great leverage over national 
governments, especially those-like Indonesia-which are heavily reliant on short-term 
borrowings.  
 The contemporary period is characterised by flows of financial capital of 
unprecedented magnitude and rapidity. Not only does the scale of financial flows 
continue to increase, but the structure of broadly defined financial capital continues to 
evolve. To give some indication of the significance of the scale of capital movements, 
by some estimates the daily turnover on the world's foreign exchange markets 
amounts to some US$1.5 trillion,6 a figure that dwarfs the entire annual gross 
national product of Indonesia, which is a comparatively modest US$136 billion.7 
Clearly, Indonesia is not unique in this regard, but where domestic actors have 
exacerbated their vulnerability to external economic forces by borrowing heavily in 
international markets, this economic disparity becomes even more influential.  
 The increasing size of financial movements is matched by the growing 
complexity of financial instruments and structures. Much of what is most distinctive 
about the contemporary era-especially the extreme mobility of capital and its 
increasingly extra-territorial characteristics-is permitted by, if not a function of, 
changes in the technological base of the global economy.8 In short, the development 
of powerful computers and reliable, instantaneous global communications systems 
have allowed capital to become increasingly fungible and abstracted from any direct 
connection with underlying 'real' economic activity. This tendency to increased 
disconnection from the actual production of goods and services has been reinforced 
by the development of new financial structures. Through the use of an array of novel 
financial instruments like currency swaps, hedging and futures mechanisms, 
marketable securities, and various forms of bonds, holders of financial assets are -
theoretically, at least - able to spread risk across a range of instruments and markets. 
The underlying international trend is for the replacement of traditional bank loans with 
equity and bond issues.9 This means that not only is the relationship between 
industry and domestic banking sectors becoming increasingly attenuated, but also 
that both firms and governments themselves are becoming more dependent upon 
potentially mobile international sources of capital.  
 A final systemic change which is another important source of the increased 
scale of financial movements, and which also indicates the fundamental 
interconnectedness of the global economy, is the exponential growth of institutional 
investors, particularly mutual funds. Mutual funds are emblematic of the new financial 
order that has emerged over the last couple of decades. Simply put, mutual funds are 
a way of pooling the savings of a large number of individual investors and then 
reinvesting them in an array of liquid assets like bonds and equities. In the space of 
10 years mutual fund holdings have increased from US$0.7 trillion to more than 
US$4 trillion.10 It is not simply the size of these holdings that makes mutual funds 
such influential forces in global markets, but also the relentless competition between 
mutual fund managers to try and achieve market dominance, a factor which 
introduces an inherent short-termism and volatility to global equity, bond and 
currency markets.11 In sum, capital-other than that directly invested in productive 
activity-has become more abstracted and distanced from the underlying real 
economy, and increasingly mobile and able to seek out profitable opportunities 
anywhere in the global economy, no matter how remote, fleeting or marginal such 
opportunities may be. When markets of such size and liquidity move en masse, the 
impact on any economy, let alone comparatively small ones like Indonesia's, is 
necessarily highly destabilising.  
 
International politics  
 
It is also important to emphasise that the increased mobility of financial capital has 
been facilitated by politically determined changes to the international economic 
system. Changes in the international regulatory framework have reflected the 
interests of powerful countries and influential domestic actors. For example, the 
continuing dominance of the USA in the global financial order has allowed it not only 
to pursue its own national interests, but also to impose a particular sort of economic 
order internationally.12 Promoting an open financial order has allowed the USA to 
maintain policy autonomy and shift the burden of adjustment on to other countries, an 
option unavailable to other countries confronting long-term decline. Faced with the 
liberalising initiatives of large economies like the USA, other economies, even 
comparatively powerful ones, have had little choice but to follow suit or risk losing 
business and placing themselves at a competitive disadvantage.13 In other words, the 
emergence and consolidation of a liberalised international financial system was not 
so much the product of technological determinism or the simultaneous recognition of 
technically optimal solutions to the problem of resource allocation, but rather of the 
systematic application of political power.  
 As economic activity has become more internationalised, the influence of 
extra-territorial regulatory authorities has become greater and the agreements that 
govern international commerce have become more significant. There are two aspects 
to this process that need distinguishing. On the one hand, there has been a subtle 
'ideational' shift, in which a number of key policy ideas broadly associated with the 
so-called ‘Washington consensus'-fiscal discipline, financial and trade liberalisation, 
privatisation and 'deregulation'-have become the centrepiece of domestic policy 
agendas in many countries.14 This ideational convergence has been reinforced by 
powerful international institutions, which have used a number of strategies, from 
intellectual persuasion to the less subtle utilisation of direct economic leverage, to 
ensure the effective application of what has been described as disciplinary 
neoliberalism.15 In short, the activities of the original Bretton Woods creations, the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which have been so prominent in 
the current crisis, have been supplemented and reinforced by a number of other pro-
market institutions, like the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, to provide an influential agenda of reform that 
directly challenges the existing economic practices and political relations of East 
Asia.16  
 The increasingly powerful institutions which govern the conduct of 
international economic activity are therefore not simply apolitical creations or 
functional, technically necessary responses to the complexities of a global economy. 
While such organisations clearly do have a management role, they are guided by 
specific assumptions, not just about the way the world works according to an 
influential strand of predominantly 'Western' neoclassical economics,17 but rather 
about the way the world should work from the perspective of a powerful constellation 
of political interests. Recognition of the essentially political nature of international 
economic relations allows us to see why the current crisis in East Asia is about much 
more than competing economic policy frameworks.  
 
Economic policy making in East Asia  
 
Although the countries of East Asia are a highly diverse group of nations 
characterised by differences in culture, tradition and history, they display some 
noteworthy similarities in political and economic practice. In the Anglo-American 
nations in general, and in the USA in particular, the economic and political spheres 
are, in theory at least, characterised by arms-length relationships and a normative 
preference for the maintenance of a clear demarcation between them. In East Asia, 
by contrast, the state has played a much more influential role in shaping the 
trajectory of national economic development.18  
 There are by now a large number of studies that have illustrated the 
distinctive role played by national governments in the economic development of East 
Asia.19 For all of these states the regional exemplar, and the first nation to challenge 
North American and European economic hegemony in the industrial era, has been 
Japan. The most distinctive characteristics of the Japanese political economy, and 
the factors that distinguish it most from its Anglo-American rivals, are the close, 
cooperative relationship between the state and business on the one hand, and the 
planned nature of economic development on the other. Chalmers Johnson's 
celebrated depiction of the Japanese state as ‘plan rational' nicely captures the 
important distinction between the Anglo-American economies which, theoretically at 
least, prefer to rely on market forces to determine economic outcomes, and the 
Japanese model which considers state involvement in directing and coordinating 
economic activity to be not simply legitimate, but an essential aspect of national 
economic development.20  
 While debate about the ultimate efficacy of government intervention in 
economic activity has been given renewed life in the wake of the current crisis, what 
is significant here is that Japan has been an important influence on economic 
development, and not just at the level of developmental exemplar. In Taiwan and 
Korea, Japanese colonialism directly reconfigured domestic class forces and 
economic structures and the subsequent course and style of national 
development.21In a number of other second- and third-generation East Asian 
economies, including Indonesia, Japanese companies in cooperation with the 
Japanese government have effectively integrated regional economic space into a 
complex network of production structures with their apex in Tokyo.22 Many of the 
countries of East Asia have found the Japanese state-directed model conducive to 
national projects of economic expansion and integral to national political 
consolidation. In short, the East Asian model of state-led neo-mercantilism, with little 
separation between political and economic interests, presents a direct challenge to 
Anglo-American, neoliberal orthodoxy at both the normative and the more narrowly 
pragmatic levels.  
 As far as the current crisis is concerned, therefore, there are a couple of 
points of particular significance. First, at the level of economic policy making, one of 
the cornerstones of East Asian development-state control of financial resources and 
access to investment capital-is directly threatened by the sorts of initiatives being 
proposed under IMF auspices. Although the high domestic savings rates that 
champions of economic orthodoxy like the World Bank emphasise have clearly been 
an important part of East Asia's rapid economic development,23 what is of equal, if 
not greater, significance is that such savings were channelled through state-
controlled banking systems towards targeted industries or borrowers in order to 
encourage specific forms of industrial development.24 Indeed, it is important to 
emphasise that the countries of East Asia and the Anglo-American economies have 
had-until recently, at least-quite different financial systems, methods of raising capital 
and transmission mechanisms for utilising finance.  
A critical difference between the financial systems of the Anglo-American and 
the East Asian economies has been that the latter are predominantly credit-based 
systems of finance, whereas the former are centred on capital markets, in which 
security issues-stocks and bonds-are a major method of raising capital.25 In other 
words, where the Anglo-Americans have tended to allow relatively unfettered market 
forces to determine the allocation of financial resources, governments in East Asia 
have attempted to maintain much closer controls over flows of capital and to use 
access to finance as a key source of leverage over domestic business interests in 
order to direct the process of economic development. The capacity of ‘strong ' East 
Asian states to develop structures of economic governance which have fostered 
rapid economic growth and allowed them to ‘catch up' with the industrialised 'West' 
has become one of the most remarked features of contemporary political economy.26 
It is important, however, to add a couple of caveats to the stylised depictions of these 
rival economic systems before considering the Indonesian experience.  
First, while important differences remain in the way companies from different 
countries are organised, and despite the persistence of major differences in political 
structures and economic practices across nations and regions,27 there are some 
signs of economic convergence between Anglo-American and East Asian economic 
structures. In the USA, for example, stock issues have become a less significant part 
of capital raising. Loans have become the preferred vehicle for companies to raise 
funds, permitting the waves of takeovers, acquisitions and leveraged buy-outs that 
characterise contemporary North American capitalism.28 The significance of this in 
the context of this discussion is twofold. First, it has given even greater influence to 
the financial sector in US foreign and domestic policy, privileging the interests of a 
rentier class over industrial interests and thereby creating increased political pressure 
for international financial liberalisation.29 Second, new forms of capital raising have 
increased the amount of financial capital in circulation, adding greater systemic 
volatility to the international system.  
The other point to make about the stylised depictions of Anglo-American 
versus East Asian forms of capitalism is that the latter do have serious deficiencies 
about which critics within and outside Asia are right to draw attention. As Japan 
demonstrates, close relations between government and business may have 
facilitated the planned development of that economy, but they have also generated 
corruption, inefficiency and the wastage of public funds, from which the majority of 
Japanese excluded from political, bureaucratic or corporate networks derive little 
benefit.30 Some of the less attractive aspects of the Japanese model have also been 
replicated among its East Asian acolytes. Indeed, it is the supposed cronyism and 
lack of transparency associated with close government-business relations in Asia 
that has been at the centre of the predominantly Anglo-American reformist discourse. 
In this regard, Indonesia, or more specifically the political practices and economic 
structures found within its borders, has been subject to an especially close scrutiny 
from which it is unlikely to emerge intact.  
 
The Indonesian experience  
 
Of all the countries caught up in the current crisis in the region, none has been more 
profoundly affected than Indonesia. This is noteworthy in itself, as it is important to 
remember that, when East Asia's economic problems began, it was Thailand, not 
Indonesia, which was at the centre of what initially appeared to be a fairly localised 
currency crisis.31 If the crisis has one unequivocal lesson, therefore, it is that 
systemic shocks are now liable to be transmitted with dramatic rapidity throughout 
the international economic system. Indeed, so interconnected has the world economy 
become, it is not yet certain that the other North American and European legs of the 
'triad' will not eventually feel the effects of accumulated financial pressures. The 
intention here, however, is to examine the Indonesian case, and try to unravel why it 
was so badly affected and how what was initially portrayed as an economic problem 
became a profound political crisis with domestic and international implications.  
 
The comparatively small scale of the Indonesian economy and its relative lack of 
diversity has meant that Indonesian policy makers have been especially constrained 
by external political and economic factors. Although the past 20 or so years have 
witnessed a major restructuring of the Indonesian economy, with a secular decline in 
the importance of agriculture and a rapid rise in manufacturing,32 Indonesian policy 
makers have-with the noteworthy and revealing exception of the ‘oil boom' period-
nevertheless been at the mercy of external forces over which they had little control. 
Even those wider geopolitical forces of which Indonesian political elites in particular 
might have been expected to be the principal beneficiaries-the superpower rivalries 
of the Cold War being the most obvious example33-have disappeared. The 
consolidation of capitalism as an unchallenged global system meant that the Suharto 
government was deprived of potential strategic leverage over critically important 
international actors like the USA.34 In an era in which governmental legitimacy is 
increasingly bound up with technocratic competence and-especially in 'developing' 
countries like Indonesia-the ability to deliver rising standards of living for the mass of 
the population, the contemporary crisis was, therefore, potentially even more 
destabilising.  
While there is no space here to detail Indonesia's political or economic 
history,35 there is one enduring historical pattern that merits emphasis as it helps to 
explain the dynamics of the contemporary crisis. In short, policy autonomy in 
Indonesia has directly reflected the fluctuating value of international oil prices. The 
economic policies of the Suharto government were from its earliest days shaped by a 
tension between the need to accommodate the interests of potentially highly mobile 
investors-both internationally and to a lesser extent among powerful domestic 
Chinese capitalists-and by the desire to use policy as an extension of a patrimonial 
system that depended for its continuance on the distribution of economic assets to 
key supporters. Before and after the ‘oil boom' years of 1974-82, the Suharto regime 
was constrained by the structural power of international investors: Indonesia's 
dependence on external capital meant that the ruling elite had to consider how the 
holders of mobile financial assets would respond to domestic policy initiatives. When 
rising oil prices placed huge windfall revenues in the hands of the Indonesian state, 
the shackles on domestic policy were released as government became less 
dependent on external capital.36  
 This is not to suggest that there were no forces within Indonesia that were 
sympathetic to the emergent international orthodoxy of deregulation and 
liberalisation. On the contrary, there were. But the power and influence of the so-
called 'technocrats' was itself a direct function of the strength or weakness of the 
Indonesian economy more generally.37 When oil revenues declined and the economy 
got into trouble, Suharto recognised that economic stability and sustained 
development depended on the continuing good opinion of international investors. In 
other words, rather than being won over by the intellectual arguments of the 
technocrats, Indonesian policy was a pragmatic response to the structural power and 
demands of mobile investment capital. As Hal Hill points out, a deep-seated mistrust 
of market forces, economic liberalism, and private (especially Chinese) ownership 
[remains] in many influential quarters in Indonesia,38 Whether reluctantly embraced 
or not, economic liberalisation has, however, had a profound impact on both the 
Indonesian economy and the government's ability to manage it. For this reason it is 
important to look more closely at the reform process and its effects.  
 
Economic reform and its impact in Indonesia  
 
As with a number of other 'developing' countries,39 a key dynamic shaping 
Indonesian economic policy under Suharto's New Order regime was the relationship 
with wider external economic forces in general and the availability and nature of 
capital inflows in particular. In Indonesia, where such flows were largely the result of 
increased oil revenues, policy makers enjoyed a degree of insulation from the 
demands of mobile financial asset holders and transnational regulatory agencies 
alike. Yet, when oil prices plummeted, government policy rapidly began to reflect the 
ideas of domestic technocrats and the influential international economic orthodoxy of 
liberalisation and deregulation. This dialectic has been central to Indonesia's 
economic developmental trajectory and has underpinned Indonesia's distinctive 
political order.40 However, it is important to recognise the long-term implications of 
this process: the concessions Indonesia's policy makers made to external forces in 
times of economic downturn systematically eroded the government's long-term 
capacity to manage the economy and threatened to unravel the very basis of the 
patrimonial system upon which the Suharto regime was predicated.  
 Patrimonial politics and ‘sheer bureaucratic incapacity ' have, MacIntyre 
argues,41 severely limited the Indonesian government's ability to put into place the 
sorts of policy frameworks and technocratic strategies that have characterised the 
developmental experiences of a number of other East Asian countries like Japan and 
Taiwan.42 Not only has the Indonesian state had less ‘infrastructural power' and 
ability to direct the course of development,43 but some observers have questioned 
whether the full ramifications of policy initiatives were clear to their sponsors. The 
opening of the capital account in 1971 has been cited as an example of a policy 
initiative that was put in place without a full understanding of its implications.44 The 
key point about this initiative as far as the current crisis is concerned is that removing 
controls on foreign exchange transactions and opening the capital account meant 
that the private sector was free to undertake international borrowings with little 
government oversight. More importantly in the long term, not only was the 
government's ability to allocate capital reduced (and thus its capacity to direct 
economic development), but the power of mobile international capital was further 
enhanced as the possibility of capital flight increased in a more liberal financial 
environment.  
 The contradictions and tensions of the Suharto regime's approach to 
economic policy making have been encapsulated in the government's management 
of the critically important oil sector. The state-owned oil company, Pertamina, 
became a vehicle for economic nationalists to pursue a wider developmental agenda. 
In the early 1970s under Ibnu Sutowo's leadership and with Suharto's blessing, 
Pertamina became a conduit for large-scale foreign borrowings and, as the price of 
oil rose during that decade, it developed into a major centre of economic power.45 
However, the inability of Pertamina to service its debts precipitated a crisis in 1975 
which prefigures the contemporary situation in a number of ways: international 
confidence in Indonesia's economic management capacity was undermined; capital 
flight exacerbated the government's problems; and the USA supported IMF attempts 
to rectify the situation by suspending loan eligibility-a move which directly reinforced 
the position of Indonesia's pro-market technocrats.46  
 Two comparative points are worth making about this earlier crisis and 
Indonesia's contemporary problems. First, the apparent lack of transparency which 
preceded the earlier episode was not an obstacle to Pertamina raising capital 
internationally or a bar to other capital inflows. Moreover, neither was it a barrier 
when the crisis was resolved and foreign investment gathered pace again during the 
1980s and 1990s. Second, the dynamics of the contemporary crisis are of a different 
order to the earlier episode. Although the earlier crisis occurred in the context of a 
more generalised period of international economic turbulence and downturn, 
Indonesia's problems were essentially domestic, rather than being externally 
generated. The point to emphasise here is that the changing international economic 
environment, particularly the expanded scale and scope of highly mobile financial 
flows, has radically altered the environment within which nations must operate. Put 
simply, the enhanced power and mobility of finance means that the perceptions of 
international financial markets, institutional investors and ratings agencies may 
rapidly transform the position of a country that is relatively dependent on foreign 
lending.47  
 Indonesia's problems have been exacerbated by the crucial intersection 
between international structural transformation and domestic policy initiative. No 
matter that deregulasi was undertaken unwillingly in the face of the reinvigorated 
structural power of internationally mobile investors; once in place, policies of greater 
economic openness and greater financial deregulation inevitably left countries like 
Indonesia more vulnerable to international capital movements. Despite becoming 
increasingly dependent on highly mobile flows of international capital, and despite 
having a significant debt servicing requirement, Indonesia's situation looked a good 
deal less vulnerable than did Thailand's-the original epicentre of the contemporary 
crisis. Thailand was much more dependent on short-term capital inflows than 
Indonesia and its overall position was consequently more fragile.48 Indeed, it is worth 
noting that, when judged in terms of its overall economic 'fundamentals'-foreign 
reserves, current account deficits, trade balance and GDP growth-Indonesia's 
economy actually looked healthier than that of its neighbour Australia, which has not 
(yet) experienced a similar mauling from international financial markets. Again, the 
point to re-emphasise here is that structural exposure to international markets leaves 
individual countries vulnerable to rapid changes in market sentiment and even more 
destabilising shifts of footloose capital. Quite how damaging changing market 
sentiment can be may be judged from the impact on investment flows to the region: 
whereas South Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia received a 
collective inflow of US$93 billion in 1996, in 1997 (in the comparatively early stages 
of the crisis) a net private capital outflow of US$12 billion occurred.49  
 For comparatively small economies like Indonesia's, therefore, the global 
trend towards economic openness and liberalisation-especially of the international 
financial system-is a mixed blessing. True, it offers access to large pools of external 
investment capital, but at the same time it necessarily decreases national policy 
autonomy, leaves the country as a whole vulnerable to rapid, destabilising capital 
flight and raises the prospect of being afflicted by unexpected contagion effects that 
may have no immediate domestic cause. Certainly, the problems of Indonesian 
borrowers have been compounded by their own failure to recognise the dangers 
implicit in the new economic order and 'hedge' against possible fluctuations in 
currency values. Yet Indonesian borrowers were not alone in their miscalculations: 
the apparent stability of the currency 'peg' which aligned the currencies of Southeast 
Asia to the US dollar not only induced a lack of caution among Indonesian investors; 
it also caused many foreigners to lend recklessly on the assumption that the value of 
their investments would be underwritten by a stable currency and the often direct 
involvement of governments in national economies.50 In the contemporary global 
economy, neither of these assumptions has proved supportable. From reform to 
revolution  
 Remarkably enough, what began as a localised currency crisis in Thailand 
has ultimately caused the collapse of a neighbouring government. While there may 
be few tears shed for the demise of the Suharto regime, the manner of its passing 
raises questions which transcend the Indonesian case.  
 One of the most striking and revealing aspects of the management of the 
region's current problems is not just that the crisis was completely unforeseen by the 
vast majority of observers, including the IMF, but that its management has been the 
subject of much contestation. It is important to remember that, before the crisis, 
influential international institutions like the World Bank explicitly endorsed the role 
played by East Asia's interventionist states and the attention they have paid to the 
so-called ‘economic fundamentals'.51 The failure to foresee any problem with the 
international economic system in general, and the problems facing East Asia in 
particular, helps explain the IMF's initial resort to the conventional orthodoxy of fiscal 
restraint, cost cutting and retrenchment. But even orthodox commentators have been 
quick to point out that, while these remedies may have been appropriate in the 
context of Mexico's recent financial crisis-although this is debatable in itself 52-East 
Asia faces quite different problems that have more to do with a crisis of confidence 
and financial panic than they do with any inattention to economic fundamentals.53  
 Despite the possible inappropriateness of the IMF's proposed solutions to the 
crisis, the organisation wields so much international influence that the governments 
of countries like Indonesia have little choice but to comply with its 'recommendation' 
or risk further destabilising attacks from ‘the markets' and the withdrawal of direct 
financial assistance. The scale of Indonesia's difficulties has made external pressure 
virtually irresistible: the rupiah fell by 80 per cent against the dollar in six months 54 
and it is estimated that Indonesian companies owe more than US$80 billion to 
external lenders, much of which is unhedged and short-term.55 There are two 
critically important clusters of consequences that flow from the IMF's proposed 
reforms that merit particular emphasis.  
 First, at the domestic level, the IMF's reform package is fundamentally 
incompatible with Indonesia's existing political economy, even in the absence of 
Suharto. The insistence on an independent central bank, further trade liberalisation, 
the ending of marketing monopolies and a general increase in the 'transparency' of 
economic relationships is all designed to transform Indonesia's opaque business 
practices and the patterns of patronage, cronyism and corruption that have recently 
become such a prominent part of reformist discourse.56 The IMF's insistence that 
subsidies for fuel and electricity be eliminated not only has the potential to unravel 
existing political and economic structures, but has contributed to the undermining of 
basic social order. The rioting that played such a crucial part in undermining 
Suharto's authority also had a profound impact on the potentially vulnerable Chinese 
business class.57 The Suharto government's position was further undermined by the 
ill-conceived suggestion that it might create a ‘currency board', in which the value of 
the rupiah would be tied to the dollar.58 Its advocacy at such a moment displayed little 
appreciation of the power of financial markets and the inability of nation-states to 
maintain policy autonomy. The original trigger for the crisis was, after all, the 
unsuccessful attempt by the countries of Southeast Asia to peg their currencies to 
the dollar, a policy which ultimately eroded their competitiveness and left them 
vulnerable to speculative attacks from financial markets. Whatever the intrinsic merits 
of the currency board proposal, its lasting significance in an Indonesian context is 
likely to be as a symbol of the continuing decline of state sovereignty in the face of 
transnational institutional and market pressures.  
 The second important group of effects that flow from the IMF's reforms are 
international. Significantly, the IMF's reform package is, as far as many East Asian 
observers are concerned, directly associated with the USA and its foreign policy 
agenda.59 In other words, a major aspect of the contemporary crisis revolves around 
competing visions of the way capitalism might, indeed ought, to be organised.60 The 
crisis represents a major opportunity for external state actors to force the sorts of 
change that have been advocated by a range of transnational organisations like the 
WTO and APEC in an era in which the USA can privilege economic interests 
unconstrained by Cold-War strategic imperatives.61 The reaction of the financial 
markets to the initial ascension of ‘interventionist' Minister for Research and 
Technology, B.J Habibie, to the position of vice-presidential candidate suggests that 
his presidency will be constrained and characterised by the need to placate powerful 
external forces.62 Put simply, not only are countries like Indonesia being forced to 
come to terms with the 'technical' requirements of policy formulation in an 
increasingly open internationalised economy,63 they may also no longer even enjoy 
the luxury of unilaterally deciding which personnel will attempt the task of national 
economic management.64  
 It is at this point that an extremely powerful convergence occurs between the 
activities of private market players and the more overt political interventions of 
institutions like the IMF and countries like the USA. The dominant normative 
discourse which privileges market mechanisms and which calls for greater 
transparency in national political economies is not only actively championed by the 
IMF, but is directly reinforced by the actions of financial markets, especially at times 
of crisis and uncertainty. This is not to say that such prescriptions for economic 
reform and management are in some way 'correct', or that they are even a necessary 
precondition for market profitability. On the contrary, the situation before the crisis 
unambiguously demonstrates that East Asian political and economic practices were 
no barrier to profitability as far as outside investors were concerned. But at a time of 
panic in global financial markets, the discourse of neoliberal reformism provides a 
convenient retrospective rationale for the inherent irrationality of processes that were 
internal to markets themselves.  
 
Concluding remarks  
 
The contemporary crisis in Indonesia and the East Asian region more generally 
dramatically illustrates how the international political economy has changed and the 
way such changes have affected individual nation-states. The political elites of 
smaller economies like Indonesia's now find their policy autonomy increasingly 
constrained by transnational regulatory agencies which enjoy powerful political 
support and are in turn a major influence on international financial markets. While this 
is a ubiquitous economic management problem from which even the USA itself is not 
immune,65 it is especially problematic for smaller countries like Indonesia, which are 
dependent on access to mobile international capital to underpin not just rapid and 
continuing economic development, but an entrenched system of domestic patronage 
that is a central component of the existing political order.  
 Indeed, given the inherently threatening nature of the reforms that were 
forced upon the Suharto government, several aspects of the crisis are worth re-
emphasising. From an East Asian perspective the governments of the region in 
general and the Suharto government in particular have been engaged in a dialectical 
relationship with the external international economy that threatens to undo their 
management of, and control over, national economic resources. In short, 
liberalisation may have granted access to huge sources of international capital to 
countries like Indonesia, but it has been achieved at the cost of diminished economic 
autonomy. Where there has been little discrimination between the type of financial 
flows, or supervision of the purposes to which such inflows were put, then the 
problems of national economic management have been compounded.  
 Nevertheless, the most important and unambiguous lesson to emerge from 
the current crisis is about the structure of the global political economy of which 
Indonesia is a part. Simply put, the most significant change in the contemporary 
international economic order has been the increasing scale, scope and rapidity of 
movements of financial capital. Moreover, financial capital is not simply of greatly 
increased size and significance, but the controllers of such mobile financial assets 
exercise a good deal of power in the international system. Whether it is manifest 
directly by capital flight from the 'periphery' at times of crisis, or more subtly in the 
attempts of key investment houses to influence US foreign and economic policy, 
financial capital is becoming an increasingly important influence on the global political 
economy and the norms, rules and practices which govern it. Individual national 
governments, especially of smaller economies like Indonesia's, are therefore 
extremely vulnerable to rapid transformations in their economic position and 
increasingly subject to the disciplinary power of financial markets. Governments that 
fail to subscribe to the currently powerful and influential market-centred, neoliberal 
orthodoxy may find themselves subjected to market pressures they are unable to 
resist.  
 What we appear to be witnessing, in short, is the commodification of the 
nation-state itself. As financial capital becomes increasingly disconnected from 
economic activity and 'investment' occurs through a range of intermediaries and 
instrumentalities which exaggerate this attenuation, then financial flows are 
determined principally by fluctuating market sentiment and the 'image' of the nation in 
the eyes of potentially mobile investors. In such circumstances, 'investment' 
decisions may have a good deal more to do with what Charles Kindleberger called 
‘general irrationality or mob psychology' 66 than with economic fundamentals, 
however defined. The somewhat ironic implication of this for 'Indonesia' is that the 
removal of Suharto could restore market confidence without changing the underlying 
structures of political power and economic patronage which have apparently become 
such a source of concern to outside investors and regulatory authorities. Given that 
authoritarianism, corruption and a state-business nexus were not a bar to investment 
until recently, it is quite conceivable that a repackaged Indonesian state could yet 
regain the favour of ‘the markets'. The key to restoring the fortunes of 'Indonesia', in 
other words, is a shift in market sentiment. It is a development that is dependent 
upon the internal dynamics of international financial markets, a process which has 
only the most tenuous connection with economic or political realities within Indonesia 
itself. In such circumstances, democratic reform-if it occurs-will be a fortunate by-
product of, rather than a functional necessity for, restored profitability. The point to 
emphasise is that even a democratic government would not be immune to precisely 
the sorts of external pressures that undid the Suharto regime.  
 Although attention has been predominantly focused on the immediate drama 
of Suharto's downfall and the associated social unrest, Indonesia's troubles raise 
important long-term questions about the management of what is an increasingly 
global economic order. Central in this regard are the appropriateness of the orthodox 
economic prescriptions handed down by the IMF, which have played a central role in 
exacerbating an already difficult situation. Simply enhancing the influence of market 
forces and further liberalising financial flows is likely to introduce further systemic 
volatility into both the regional and the wider global economy. It is not, therefore, 
simply because the current programme of IMF-sponsored crisis management is 
associated with the foreign policy interests of the USA and their desire to establish 
themselves on a more competitive footing in East Asia that the regional crisis has 
wider, more enduring implications. It is also because the very structure of the global 
economy, in particular its market-centred and increasingly privatised structures of 
governance, is contributing an inherent volatility and unpredictability to the whole 
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